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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
--------------------------------------------------------------
In The Matter Of The Adoption Of 
KARLA JEAN ANDERSON, a minor, 
JAMES REED HALL and 
BRENDA M. HALL, 
v. 
Appellants, 
THOMAS LeROY ANDERSON, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 14 7.05 
--------------------------------------------------------------
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
-------------------------------------------------------------· 
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L 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants' appeal from the decision of the District 
Court of Uintah County, State of Utah, denying appellants' Peti-
tion for Adoption. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On May 12, 1976 a hearing was held in the District 
Court in and for Uintah County, the Honorable J, Robert Bullock 
presiding, on appellants' motion to adopt Karla Jean Anderson 
without permission from Karla Jean Anderson's natural father on 
the grounds of abandonment. The Petition was denied on May 14, 
1976. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the lower court's decision 
vacated and judgment entered in appellants' favor declaring that 
Karla Jean Anderson's natural father abandoned her within the 
meaning of Sec. 78-30-1, Utah Code Ann., and that appellants' 
Petition to Adopt Karla Jean Anderson without her natural fatlile.~ 1 s 
consent be granted. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A Decree of Divorce was entered on March 13, 1972, 
granting a final Decree of Divorce between Thomas L. Anderson 
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and petitioner, Brenda M, Hall, formerly known as Brenda M. 
Anderson, parents of Karla Jean Anderson. custody of the child 
was awarded to the then Brenda M. Anderson with visiting rights, 
granted to Thomas L. Anderson and a further requirement of 
child support required of Thomas L. Anderson. In 1972 Brenda 
M. Anderson married James R. Hall. 
From the time of the granting of the divorce decree 
until the present time Thomas L. Anderson made a total of $150 
child support payments as the Court stated in its Findings of 
Fact. The Court further found that at all times pertinent to 
this case Thomas L. Anderson knew where petitioners w_ere living. 
Finally, the Court found that the existence of the natural father 
is totally unknown to the child and that Karla Jean Anderson 
looks upon James R. Hall, petitioner, as her father. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT 
FINDING THAT THOMAS L. ANDERSON 
HAD ABANDONED HIS DAUGHTER. 
Sec. 78-30-5, Utah Code Ann., as amended in 1965, pro· 
vides that when a child is deserted by its parents it may be 
adopted without the natural parent's consent. The obvious intent 
of the legislature is to allow a child the happiness and emo-
tional stability provided by a warm and loving family unit with· 
out delay or undue anguish when parents abandon children. The 
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entire statute is structured to provide the greatest benefit to 
the child in circumstances where the child is receiving no emo-
tional support or other kinds of support from its natural parents. 
The circumstances envisioned by the statute are pre-
cisely the kinds of circumstances that exist in the case at bar. 
Petitioner, Mrs. Hall, testified (p. 4,5,7, TT) that Mr. Anderson 
had made no attempt, save one immediately after the divorce 
decree, to even see the child. Furthermore, she testified that 
Mr. Anderson had been in the area where the Halls were living 
and never made an attempt even to use the phone to call and 
inquire as to the child's well-being. This is supported by Mr. 
Hall's testimony, who testified that he lived in Dutch John, /A*t-J 
Arizona, and met Mr. Anderson while he too worked in the same town 
for the Forest Service (p. 11, TT). This testimony was not con-
troverted by Mr. Anderson, nor indeed was any evidence introduced 
to show that when Mr. Anderson was in the vicinity of the Hall's 
he made any attempt to visit or call about the child's welfare. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand how a parent 
can claim love and affection for a child and yet make no attempt 
when in the vicinity of the child's residence to make some physi-
cal contact, even if only a phone call. Certainly a medical 
problem that would not have prevented Mr. Anderson from traveling 
would not have prevented him from a simple phone call. Yet the record 
is devoid of any such attempts. 
Similarly, Mr. Anderson testified that he has remarried. 
~has a wife and two children and supports them but still neglects 
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the child he claims to love and cherish. Irregularly and infre-
quently, insignificant and insubstantial gestures have been made, 
amounting over a three year period to virtually nothing in view 
of the paramount and pressing needs of a child in the very forrna· 
ti ve and crucial years of her life, when substantial and effectiv: 
emotional needs must be met. During these y~ars the Halls met 
all of Karla's needs. Mr. Anderson was never there. 
Instead in the early part of January 1973, Mr. Anderson 
writes Mrs. Hall requesting permission to use his daughter as a 
"tax break." Certainly, this is communication to the mother, 
but the~ of communication sufficient to warrant a finding of 
love and affection? In June 1973 another letter appears in the 
record written by Mr. Anderson arguing payments which were not 
made. The record will also show that up to May 26, 1973 cornmuni· 
cation can be said to be regular. But after the June 1973 letter 
from Thomas to Brenda there is a virtual dearth of communication. 
No substantiation appears in the record for the allegec 
Christmas money of 12-16-75, and Mrs. Hall denied receiving it. 
Since the answers to the interrogatories were filed on the 23d 
day of February, 1976, and since Mr. Anderson kept meticulous 
records of his communications with the Halls, it must be pre-
sumed that this payment is an error. Consequently, from June 
1973 until December 19, 1975, when this petition was filed, Mr. 
Anderson had sent only five insubstantial communciations to 
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p 
daughter yet claims to have saved $1500 for her (p. 17, TT) and 
again no verification appears in the record either by bank state-
ment or letter for this amount of savings. 
On the other hand, there are two letters written by 
Thomas Anderson's wife in 1975, one in May 1975 and one presum-
ably after that, (Court record, p. 26). It is interesting to 
note that these are the only two communications in the record 
although Mr. Anderson by his testimony would have us believe that 
there were many communications, And at least the first of the 
two letters came with the May 9, 1975 gift. Consequently, the 
record before the Court shows six communications by the Andersons 
from June 1973 to the December 1975 filing of the petitfbn. 
Furthermore, the last four communications, the signing 
and writing of checks and letters had been handled, accoraing to 
the record, by Mrs. Anderson and not by Mr. Anderson whe is in 
fact the natural parent. We, therefore, have evidence that in 
that period she was interested in the child, but there is'no 
evidence that the natural parent, Mr. Anderson, was interested 
in Karla. 
In re Adoption of Walton, 123 Utah 380, 259 P.2d 881 
(1953), and In re Adoption of Jameson, 20 Ut, 2d 53, 432 P.2d 
881 (1967) state what the law is with respect to Sec. 78-30-5, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended in 1965. Appellants do not 
argue that these cases are in error, but simply that the case 
at bar does not fit within the rule of those two cases. 
- 5 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah case law does not require that the natural parenti 
i 
affirmatively state that he is abandoning his children. The ; 
two cases cited merely indicate that abandonment can be deter-
mined and inferred from the natural parent's actions. In 
Jameson, supra, for example, the Court held that incarceration 
is not abandonment. "We believe and so hold that the language 
of the statute means an intentional abandonment of the child 
rather than a separation due to misfortune or misconduct." 
20 Ut. 2d at 54. 
The misconduct in the Jameson case does not apply in 
the present instance and misfortune has not been defined though 
under whatever definition, appellants contend that this case 
does not fit the circumstances. It was not misfortune that kept: 
Mr. Anderson from visiting or calling to inquire about his 
daughter when he was in her vicinity. It was lack of desire 
or want. It was not misfortune that kept defendant from writing 
to his daughter, but lack of interest. It was not misfortune 
that kept support payments from being sent to Karla, but lack 
of concern. Mr. Anderson supports a family now. Furthermore, 
if, in fact, Mr. Anderson saved $1500, that amount is equal to 
2-1/2 years of child support. How can he claim inability to pay 
child support and at the same time allege that he saved it? 
Where is the money? Where, in fact, is the proof that he saved 
it? 
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Clearly, this case does not fit the Jameson rule be-
cause, in fact, Mr. Anderson had abandoned his little girl and 
left her to be cared for by others. 
Similarly, with respect to the Walton, supra, case, 
the case at bar does not fit the facts of Walton. Effectively, 
from June 1973 to December 1975, Mr. Anderson abandoned his child. 
No support was paid during that time; no attempt at visiting 
the child or calling the child was made even when in the vicinity; 
no attempt was made to write to the child except for five gifts 
in nearly 2-1/2 years when the thought occurred to Mr. Anderson. 
In effect, others were left to care for Karla while Mr. Anderson 
might send a candygram for Easter. One is left to wonder whe-
there or not the circumstances would have changed had Mr, Anderson 
not married his present wife who seems to.be pressing for the 
child. 
Appellant submits that a line must be drawn somewhere 
if the statute is to have any meaning. Can five insignificant 
gifts over a 2-1/2 year period withstand an argument of no sup-
port, attempts at visiting, or even communication? What then 
does abandonment mean? 
As in the lower court, apparently Mr. Anderson will 
plead repentance. But is that fair for the seven year old child? 
Her feelings in the present home, after four years, are deep 
and committed. She knows only one family and feels the security, 
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warmth, and tenderness of one family unit. The child was three 
when she entered the unit and is now seven. Her entire life is 
to be disrupted now because one man sent five gifts in 2-1/2 
years? Are there not vested rights of happiness, peace, tran-
quility, security, and love present here that supersede the 
I 
tenuous threads of repentance presented and the hollow ring of i 
I 
precious few gifts? 
At no time did the Halls return these gifts. I Further·[ 
more, the record does not support the Andersons' contention 
that the Halls indicated that they no longer wanted the child 
support. The very closest the Halls came to such a pronounce-
ment was a letter dated January 12, 1973 (C.R., p. 29): 
"As far as Karla goes she's taken well 
care of and has what she needs and is 
happy and contented, so why don~t you 
just step out of the picutre!" (emphasis 
Mrs. Hall's) 
But the very next paragraph reads: 
"Either pay your child support - or just 
forget the whole thing. If Karla would 
have had to depend on you she would have 
to starve to death long before this!" 
Six months later Mr. Anderson writes and discusses the 
payments without a hint of any disclaimer by the Halls. I 
Clearly this case does not meet the fundamental tests[ 
of Walton and, therefore, appellants contend that Mr. Anderson 
abandoned his little girl and this Court should so declare. 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence clearly indicates that Mr, Anderson 
1) did not pay child support; 2} made no attempts to visit 
the child; 3) and made no attempt to communicate with the 
child except for five meager gifts in 2-1/2 years. Appellants, 
therefore, submit that Mr. Anderson had abandoned his little 
girl and that even though now he may be repentant, more harm 
than good would be done by dismissing appellants• petition. 
Therefore, appellants pray the Court to find that Mr. Anderson 
had abandoned his daughter Karla Jean and grant appellants' 
Petition to Adopt Karla. 
b 
Att 
370 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief to Marc 'SI!· -
Mascaro, Attorney for Respondent, 7417 South State Street,-
Midvale, UT 84047, this 30th day of October, 1976, postage 
prepaid. 
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